Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for your testimony. I was grabbing at some of

it in my office, read some of it along the way. And I have two sets of questions.

One is, there are news reports that came out today that President

Obama sent a letter to Russia’s President last month suggesting

that he would back off deploying a new missile defense system

in Eastern Europe if Moscow would help stop Iran from developing

the long-range weapons that we are concerned about. And

that letter supposedly, further on, said the United States would not

need to proceed with such an interceptor system, which, of course,

the Russians have vigorously opposed, if Iran halted any efforts to

build nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles.

Do you think that that is a sufficient enough incentive to get the

Russians to be engaged in a manner in which we would like to see?

And it’s open to anyone who wants to——

Anyone have a different view?

Well, it sounds like a much broader agenda

in order to get them engaged in the way in which we want. And the clock is ticking.

I’ve heard all of you basically testify, please let me know if I’m

wrong, that we should be more vigorously engaging Iran. And the

‘‘P5+1’’ process committed themselves to a dual-track process. But,

I have not received a sense of what they view that dual process—

the elements of that dual process, moving forward. Do you all have

ideas about that? At the same time as we’re talking, the clock is

also ticking, and so, what do you think that dual process being, or

should it be in the process, both on the negotiation-engagement

side, as well as on the sanctions side?

I think everyone engaged in the P5 process is dedicated to the

proposition that Iran should be presented these clear choices of

either cooperating with the world and receiving cooperation in

exchange, or pursuing the path they are on, of obtaining a nuclear

weapons capability, and the isolation, politically and economically,

that goes with that.

And most of the other partners are willing to see some strengthening

of both sides of this choice, but there are differences of opinion

in the other nations.

Sometimes there is a view, in this country, that the Europeans

are united in thinking that we should only pursue engagement,

and not strengthen the disincentives part of it. And the Europeans

are quite different on that.

I work and live in London. The British and French are probably

to the right of the United States right now. They’re a little worried,

frankly, about U.S. policy of unconditional engagement. I think

they will follow United States leadership, but they have some concerns,

because their policy had been that if Iran broke the deal

with them of suspending its enrichment program, that there

wouldn’t be negotiations on the nuclear front. So, we’re going to

have to work closely with the British and French if the United

States embarks on a different policy.

Any other views? Any views on what the

sanction side of this should be as we pursue the negotiation side?

Well, thank you. I’m going to have to go to

this vote, but I appreciate your collective testimony and your

answers to my question.

And with that, seeing no other members, the committee is

adjourned. Thank you for your testimony.